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We develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment with public policy 
on  education.  Beyond  the  traditional  mechanisms  through  which  knowledge,  growth  and  the 
environment interplay, we stress out the role played by education on environmental awareness. 
Assuming ﬁrst that environmental awareness is constant, we show the existence of a balanced 
growth  path  along  which  environmental  quality  increases  continually.  Then,  if  education 
enhances environmental awareness, the equilibrium properties are modiﬁed: the economy can 
reach a steady state or converge to an asymptotic balanced growth path. Therefore, education 
does not necessarily promote sustained and sustainable growth. 
Keywords:  overlapping  generations,  public  education,  environmental  maintenance,  green 
awareness, sustainable growth. 
JEL Classification: Q56, D62, D91 
                                                           
1 Université catholique de Louvain, CORE and Louvain School of Management, Chair Lhoist Berghmans in 
Environmental Economics and Management, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: 
thierry.brechet@uclouvain.be. This author is also member of ECORE, the association between CORE and 
ECARES. 
2 IREGE, Université de Savoie, France. E-mail: Fabien.prieur@univ-savoie.fr 
 
We are grateful to Raouf Boucekkine, David de la Croix, Stéphane Lambrecht and Yurii Yatsenko for their 
comments.  Preliminary  versions  were  presented  to  the  Rencontre  de  l'Environnement,  Corte,  and  to  the 
conférence on "Sustainable Development: Demographic, Energy and Intergenerational Aspects", Strasbourg 
University. 
This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by 
the  Belgian  State,  Prime  Minister's  Office,  Science  Policy  Programming.  The  scientific  responsibility  is 
assumed by the authors.  1 Introduction
By ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, almost
all countries of the world agreed to `promote education, training and public awareness
related to climate change" (UNFCCC (1992), Article 6). 1 Education is thus treated
as a policy instrument which has a role to play in combating climate change. Even
though the rational behind this is not indisputable, the macroeconomic consequences
and environmental eectiveness of educational policies have not yet been explored
from a theoretical perspective. Can countries really shape economic growth by green-
ing' agents' preferences? In what direction would such changes lead the economy?
Could they be benecial to both economic growth and environmental quality?
Empirical evidence conrms the idea that knowledge and awareness about envi-
ronmental issues improve as the agent's education level increases. A recent survey by
the European Commission reveals that the longer the respondent has spent in full-
time education, the better informed he or she feels.2 The higher the education level,
the more strongly the relationship between environmental quality and quality of life is
perceived. Furthermore, as environmental awareness increases, so does the acceptabil-
ity of regulation: \the higher the respondent's level of education, the more he or she
values the importance of making stricter regulations" (EC (2005), p. 37).3 Education,
by enhancing awareness, modies agents' trade-os towards environmental-friendly
decisions. Higher education is also related to higher income, and it is well-established
that concern for the environment increases with wealth. Hence, a natural candidate
for improving environmental awareness is raising the level of education.
On the other hand, education is today recognized as a key determinant of eco-
nomic growth (see Krueger and Lindhal 2001 for a review of theoretical and empirical
evidence). In Lucas's (1988) seminal paper, agents can improve their skills by devot-
ing time to education. The accumulation of human capital enhances the productivity
of labor, and allows the economy to experience sustained growth. In an overlapping
generations model, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) explain the emergence of poverty
trap by the existence of threshold eects in education. In these papers, time spent
in education depends on private agents' decisions. However in a similar framework,
Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) assume that education is nanced by public expendi-
tures. The authors emphasize the impact of education policy on growth. Their main
result is that taxing revenues to nance education and the accumulation of knowl-
edge stimulates long-term growth as long as the tax rate does not exceed the share
of human capital in production.
1The Convention on Climate Change set out an overall framework for intergovernmental eorts to
tackle climate change. This recognizes that the climate system is a shared resource whose stability
can be aected by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Ratied by 192 countries, the
Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994.
2This survey was conducted on 20,000 citizens in the 25 Member States. See EC (2005). It was
updated in 2008.
3The survey also shows that increasing environmental awareness is considered to be as eective
as stringer regulation and better enforcement at solving environmental problems.
2On that basis, the question may be raised as to whether public education policy
can promote both environmental quality and economic growth. Is education good for
green growth?
Over the last twenty years, the literature on growth and the environment has
increased substantially (see Xepapadeas 2005 and Brock and Taylor 2005 surveys).
Naturally, some authors have attempted to dissect the link between education, growth
and the environment. Gradus and Smulders (1993) review the consequences of intro-
ducing environmental concern into both exogenous and endogenous growth models.
In particular, by adding a ow of pollutant and abatement into Lucas' model, they
showed that sustained growth remains the rule in the long run. It turns out that
the constant growth rate of the economy is in fact independent of the degree of envi-
ronmental concern. Even though care for the environment crowds out investment in
physical capital (the polluting input), this eect is exactly oset by the substitution
of physical capital by human capital (the clean input). Vellinga (1999) gets the same
result with a model extended by a stock of pollutants and with separability in utility
between consumption and the environment. Within an overlapping generations model
 a la Blanchard (1985), Pautrel (2008) asks whether environmental policy may have
a positive impact on long term growth. In his setting the growth rate of the econ-
omy depends on the environmental tax. Then, under certain conditions a win-win
situation occurs, in which increasing the tax rate also benets growth by providing
households with greater incentives for education.
In sum, there are many studies that deal with education, growth and the envi-
ronment. However the interdependence between education, environmental awareness
and growth has not been explored in the literature. The purpose of our paper is to
deal with this issue.
We consider an overlapping generations model (OLG) of public expenditure on
education  a la Glomm and Ravikumar (1997). We extend this framework by in-
troducing the environment. Economic activity generates, as a by-product, polluting
emissions that degrade the quality of the environment. Private agents, whose welfare
depends on environmental quality and consumption, have the opportunity to devote
part of their resources to environmental maintenance. In this respect, our model also
extends the OLG models developed by John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al.
(1995).
As regards preferences about the environment, we follow Ono (2003) by dening
environmental awareness as the elasticity between consumption and environmental
quality. Two cases are then investigated. In the rst, we analyze the properties
of an economy composed of agents withconstant environmental awareness. The lit-
erature on endogenous growth and the environment states that constant awareness
is a necessary condition for sustainable balanced growth.4 Within this benchmark
framework we show that, under general and usual conditions, there exists a balanced
growth path where physical capital, human capital and the environmental quality
grow at a constant rate. In contrast to the earlier studies, we nd that environmental
4See notably Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996) and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997).
3awareness does inuence the growth rate of the economy: the stronger the environ-
mental awareness, the lower the growth rate. We also achieve insights into the impact
of education policy on growth, by generalizing the main conclusion of Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997). Improving education allows the economy to enjoy a higher growth
and a better environment, provided the tax rate is initially below a critical boundary
related to the share of human capital in output.
In the second case we assume that environmental awareness is positively inu-
enced by education. We call this education-led environmental awareness. It turns
out that multiple equilibria of dierent nature coexist. If awareness depends on the
level of human capital then agents' tradeos change towards more environmental
friendly decisions as they accumulate knowledge. the economy may then either reach
a steady state or follow an asymptotic balanced growth path in the long run. To
understand which of these options will occur, the stability properties of the model
are scrutinized. When the sensitivity of environmental awareness to knowledge is low,
the economy may be driven towards an asymptotic balanced growth path. However,
if environmental awareness is very sensitive to human capital, then it substantially
aects the dynamics of the economy and may drive it to a steady state. Focusing on
the steady state, we nally analyze the eects of a change in the tax rate on long term
capital, knowledge and the environment. Again, our conclusions dier from those in
the existing literature. Higher taxation does not necessarily enhance wealth and the
environmental quality, even if the tax rate is initially below the critical boundary
identied in the rst case. In other words, such a policy is less likely to produce a
win-win situation than is generally stated in the literature.
Our contribution to the literature on growth, education and the environment is
twofold. First, even if environmental awareness is not constant, there is still room
for balanced growth. Indeed, under the weaker condition that awareness is bounded
from above, we show the existence of an asymptotic balanced growth path. Second,
whereas balanced growth is possible, the economy may also be caught in a steady
state when the impact of education on awareness is taken into account. Of course,
the economic and environmental implications of these two solutions are poles apart.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows
the existence and uniqueness of the balanced growth path in the economy with con-
stant environmental awareness. It also contains some comparative statics to highlight
the impact of environmental awareness and taxation on growth. Section 4 performs
the equilibrium analysis for the economy with education-led environmental awareness
and shows how accounting for the impact of knowledge on environmental awareness
modies the results. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 5.
2 The model
The present framework is an overlapping generations model that combines consider-
ations for growth, knowledge and the environment. In a perfectly competitive world,
the rms produce a single homogeneous good used both for consumption and in-
4vestment. In addition, the use of physical capital in production generates polluting
emissions. The government levies a tax on income in order to nance education.
2.1 Production
Firms produce the nal good Yt with a constant returns to scale technology using
skilled labour Ls





t is equal to the stock of human capital Ht time the amount of unskilled
labor Lt. Since the production function is homogeneous of degree one, it can be
expressed by its intensive form: f(kt) with kt = Kt=Ls
t the capital-skilled labour
ratio.
Assumption 1. f(k) : R+ ! R+ is C2. f(0) = 0, 8k > 0, f(k) > 0, f0(k) > 0,
f00(k) < 0. There exists an upper bound to the attainable capital ~ k < 1 such that:
f(~ k) = ~ k. In addition, limk!+1 f(k) = +1 and limk!+1 f0(k) = 0.
Assuming capital depreciates at the rate  2 [0;1], prot maximization yields:
wt = f(kt)   ktf
0(kt) (2)
rt = f
0(kt)    (3)
with wt the wage rate and rt the real rental rate of capital.
2.2 The households
We consider an innite horizon economy composed of nite-lived agents. A new
generation is born in each period t = 1;2;:::; and lives for two periods: youth and old
age. There is no population growth and the size of a generation is normalized to one.
The young agent born in period t is endowed with Ht units of human capital. As in
Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), the stock of knowledge accumulates according to the
following constant returns process:
Ht+1 = G(Ht;Et) (4)
with Et the amount of public expenditures on education at period t. Dening et as the
ratio from public expenditure to knowledge, this technology rewrites: Ht+1 = Htg(et).
Assumption 2. g(e) : R+ ! R+ is C2. g(0) = 0, 8e > 0, g(e) > 0, g0(e) > 0,
g00(e) < 0. Moreover, lime!+1 g(e) = +1.
Education is thus entirely nanced by public expenditures. In that purpose the
government taxes both labor income and the interests on savings at an uniform tax
rate .
5In her youth, the agent supplies knowledge Ht to rms for a real wage wtHt. She
allocates this wage net of taxes to savings st and maintenance mt,5 taking as given
the tax rate . When retired, the agent supplies her savings to rms and earns the
return of savings Rt+1st (with Rt+1 = 1+(1 )rt+1 the interest factor). Her income
is entirely devoted to the consumption ct+1. The two budget constraints respectively
write:
(1   )wtHt = st + mt (5)
ct+1 = (1 + (1   )rt+1)st: (6)
We further assume the government's budget, at period t, is balanced:
Et = (wtHt + rtst 1) (7)
Polluting emissions are imputed to the use of physical capital and degrade envi-
ronmental quality Q. It is possible to control the level of emissions and to improve
environmental quality through the maintenance mt. The dynamics of Q are then
given by:
Qt+1 = (1   )Qt   Kt + mt; (8)
The variable Q is a broadly dened index of the quality of the environment whose
autonomous level (the level in the absence of human activity) is zero. For example,
Q may be understood as the inverse of the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse
gases. Then  2 (0;1) is the speed at which Q goes back to its autonomous level and
 > 0 (respectively,  > 0) is the parameter that represents the eect of emissions on
environmental quality (respectively, of the eciency of maintenance).
In accordance with John and Pecchenino (1994), the preferences of the agent born
at date t are dened on old age consumption ct+1 and environmental quality Qt+1.
They are described by the utility function U(ct+1;Qt+1).
Assumption 3. U(c;Q) : R+R+ ! R is C2 with: U1  0, U2  0, U11;U22  0
and limc!0 U1(c;Q) = +1. The cross derivative is positive U12  0.






This parameter represents the agents' environmental awareness, as in Ono (2003).
The larger , the stronger the value attached to the environment. Thereafter, by
convention, the utility function will be parameterized by , Ut+1(ct+1;Qt+1), and we
will focus on the specic class of utility functions with a constant elasticity: 6 In the
case where environmental awareness is given beforehand, we dene the following:
5It is possible to reinterpret mt as a tax levied by a one period lived government in order to
nance the abatement activity, for the benet of agents living during its period of oce (John et al.
1995).
6This property holds for the cases of logarithmic and Cobb-Douglas utility functions (Zhang
1999).
6Denition 1 Constant Environmental Awareness (CEA)
Preferences with Constant Environmental Awareness are such that: t = , 8t
We will use CEA preferences to elaborate a benchmark model. Typically, CEA
preferences are also used in the papers that tackle with sustainable growth (see for
instance Bovenberg and Smulders 1995, 1996 and Bovenberg and de Mooij 1997).
Having  constant is presented in the literature as a necessary condition for a balanced
growth path to exist.
Then, our purpose is to depart from this restriction on preferences by introducing
a relationship between the education level and agents' concern for the environment.
For the same class of utility functions, this leads us to consider another case where
the environmental awareness is shaped by education:
Denition 2 Education-Led Environmental Awareness (ELEA)
Preferences with Education-Led Environmental Awareness are such that: t = (Ht)
An interesting and original approach to modeling environmental awareness con-
sists in recognizing that agents' tradeos and decisions are inuenced by their level
of knowledge, particularly when these decisions encompass an environmental dimen-
sion. Indeed, one may expect that, with knowledge accumulation, private agents'
tradeos evolve toward environmental friendly decisions. In other words, the more
educated the agents, the greener their actions. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence reported in the introduction. These features are summarized in the following
assumption.
Assumption 4. (H) is such that: 0(H) > 0, 00(H)  0 and limH!1 (H) =
  < 1.7
Environmental awareness grows at a decreasing rate with knowledge. There exists
an upper bound for the weight of the environment in preferences. Even if knowledge
can potentially grow indenitely, environmental awareness asymptotically converges
to a level of full awareness of environmental issues. It must be kept in mind that, in
this model, the agent cannot inuence her own environmental awareness.
Depending on the case considered, CEA or ELEA, the representative agent born
at date t divides her resources between maintenance and savings in order to maximize
her lifetime utility. Taking prices and pollution at the beginning of period t as given,








wtHt = st + mt
ct+1 = (1 + (1   )rt+1)st
Qt+1 = (1   )Qt   Kt + mt
mt  0
7As an illustration of ELEA preferences, one may consider a log-additive utility function:
U(ct+1;Qt+1;Ht+1) = logct+1 + (Ht+1)logQt+1.
7The rst order condition (FOC) for the representative agent's problem reads
 Rt+1U1(ct+1;Qt+1) + U2(ct+1;Qt+1) = 0; (10)
Let us now dene the competitive equilibrium.
Denition 3 Intertemporal competitive equilibrium
Given the public policy in education, an intertemporal competitive equilibrium is a
sequence of per capita variables fct;mt;stg, aggregate variables fKt;Ht;Qt;Etg and
prices fwt;rtg such that:
i/ households and rms are at their optimum: the FOC (10) and the two conditions
(2) and (3), for prot maximization, are satised,
ii/ all markets clear: Lt = 1 implying Ls
t = Ht and Kt+1 = st,
iii/ individual budget constraints (5) and (6) are satised,
iv/ the government budget (7) is balanced,
v/ the dynamics of human capital are given by (4),
vi/ the dynamics of environmental quality are given by (8).
3 Competitive equilibrium in the CEA economy
In this section, the equilibrium analysis will be conducted for the case where prefer-
ences are of the CEA type.8
3.1 Balanced growth path
In the CEA economy, households preferences are given by Assumption 3. The FOC
(10) becomes
ct+1 =
(1 + (1   )rt+1)Qt+1

(11)
and, according to the denition of the competitive equilibrium, it denes a relation-
ship between Qt+1 and Kt+1
Qt+1 = Kt+1,
or equivalently
Qt+1 = Ht+1kt+1, (12)
that governs the dynamics in the positive maintenance region.
8For the sake of simplicity, we will not consider the non-negativity constraint on mt, thereby
concentrating on the interior solution.
8Thereafter, we consider that capital does not depreciate:  = 0. Then, under
conditions (2) and (3), the government's revenue expresses as a share of production:
(wtHt + rtst 1) = Htf(kt),
which implies that the dynamics of H simplify to:
Ht+1 = Htg(f(kt)): (13)
Finally, the maintenance decision is:
mt = (1   )Ht(f(kt)   ktf
0(kt))   Ht+1kt+1: (14)







Qt+1 = (1   )Qt   Htkt +  ((1   )Ht(f(kt)   ktf0(kt))   Ht+1kt+1)
(15)
Thereafter, we investigate whether a balanced growth path (BGP) exists. A BGP
is dened as follows.
Denition 4 Balanced growth path (BGP)




Qt =  Q(1 + )t
Ht =  H(1 + )t
Kt =  K(1 + )t
(16)
solves exactly (15).
A BGP is a path where all state variables grow at the same constant rate .
Let us dene capital's share of output and the elasticity of substitution between



















(k)  s(k) 8k > 0 (20)
and




then there exists a unique BGP in the CEA economy. Admissibility of the BGP
requires:
(1   )(f( k)    kf0( k))
 k
 g(f( k)) (22)
with  k, the long run physical to human capital ratio.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Condition (19) is common in the literature that studies the equilibrium properties
of the OLG-one-sector model (without environmental issue). It is also used in Prieur
(2008) who deals with this kind of issue. This condition generalizes the strengthened
Inada condition, introduced by Galor and Ryder (1989), with a public policy. It
ensures that the rst unit of capital is suciently ecient, in terms of labor pro-
ductivity (recall that the numerator in (19) corresponds to the wage w(k)), thereby
avoiding the trivial equilibrium with zero capital. It is also a necessary condition for
the existence of a non trivial equilibrium (see de la Croix and Michel (2000)). The
second condition states that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
is higher than the capital share of output.
These conditions are notably satised by the CES technologies, F(K;H) = (K +
(1   )H )
  1
, when  2 ( 1;0]. In addition, the second one seems quite reason-
able since most of the estimations of the capital share of output and the elasticity of
substitution give values respectively comprised in the range [0:3;0:4] and close to 1.
The sucient condition (21) involves many parameters and can be interpreted
as follows. Let us consider the present generation with high environmental concern
. She is willing to devote a lot of resources in order to maintain the environmental
quality. But, this decision is done at the expense of savings and negatively aects
capital accumulation. The next generation will, in turn, inherits from a lower stock
of capital. The negative income eect will translate again into a reduction of the
investment in physical capital. In order to balance this negative eect, the current
generation must, at the same time, bequeath an important amount of environmental
quality. Indeed, in this situation, the next generation will be able to substitute
maintenance for savings. It requires  and/or  (respectively ) to be low (respectively
high). This substitution allows the economy to achieve, in the long run, a sustainable
growth path. Condition (22), for admissibility, ensures that long term maintenance
is non-negative.
10Let us denote by (k) the growth factor, (k) = g(f(k)),9 and let us dene
 ex, for x = w;, as the long run elasticity with respect to k:  ex =
 kx0( k)
x( k) . Then,
a sucient condition for local stability is:  e   ew (see Appendix B). Actually, we
have  ew = s( k)s( e), where s( e) is the share of public expenditures in the education
technology. Thus, we also have that  e   ew $ s( e)  1
( k). This condition requires
the share of public expenditures in education not to be too high.10
3.2 Comparative statics
This section assesses the impact of a change in the tax rate and of a change in
environmental awareness on the long run growth rate. Along the BGP, the dynamics
(15) reduce to
(
 = g(f( k))
(1 + )g(f( k)) = (1   )  

 + (1   )

f( k)
 k   f0( k)
 (23)







Proposition 2 Along the balanced growth path,
i/ when the CEA economy grows at a non negative constant rate (  1), the
stronger the concern for the environment, the lower the growth rate.
ii/ increasing the tax enhances economic growth if and only if    , with
  =
1   s( k) + ef0s( k)
s( k)(1   s( k) + ef0s( k)) + 1   s( k)
(24)
where ef0 is the elasticity of the marginal productivity with respect to k.
Proof. Total dierentiation of equations in (23) yields:
(
d = g0(f( k))(f( k)d + f0( k)dk)
(1 + )d + d = (1   )d  

 + (1   )

f( k)









Rearranging and assuming d = 0, we get
d
d
 0 $     (26)
Now assuming d = 0,
d
d
 0 $   1   
9In the long run, the growth rate is thus equal to g(f( k))   1.
10Since s( e) < 1, it holds for the Cobb-Douglas and the CES with   0 and for some  < 0 not
too close to  1.
11The impact of environmental awareness on growth diers from the one generally
detected in the literature. Gradus and Smulders (1993), Vellinga (1999) and Pautrel
(2008) have shown that the long run growth rate is independent of the degree of
environmental concern. In their setting, the negative impact of greener preferences
on physical capital accumulation (the polluting input) is exactly oset by the greater
incentive to accumulate human capital (the clean input). Here, because education
does not rely on agents' decisions (from their point of view, it is exogenous), this
compensation does not occur. Stronger awareness implies that agents allocate more
resources to environmental maintenance. Consequently, the accumulation of both K
and H is slowed down.
The condition (24) which determines whether a change in the tax rate is benecial
for growth or not only depends on technological features, and in particular on the
(long run) share of human capital in production, 1   s( k). To illustrate the meaning
of  , let us consider the specication of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), f(k) = Ak,
 2 (0;1). Then, condition (24) reduces to   1   : increasing the tax enhances
the growth rate if and only if the tax is initially below the share of human capital
in production. This proposition generalizes the standard result of the literature (see
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997) when the environment is taken into account. An
increase in the tax rate has two opposite eects on the agent's income. There is rst
a direct negative income eect. On the one hand, in the rst period, the agent has less
resources to devote to maintenance and savings. On the other, in the second period,
she consumes less since the returns on savings decrease. But, at the same time, a
higher tax increases the government revenue and stimulates public expenditures on
education. More human capital means more production and more income distributed
to households. This corresponds to an indirect positive income eect. When   1 ,
the benets of a tax increase exceed the costs, and the growth rate of the economy is
enhanced.
Having understood the properties of the CEA economy we can now turn to the
case where environmental awareness is inuenced by the education level, what we
label the Education-Led Environmental Awareness (ELEA) economy.
4 Competitive equilibrium in the ELEA economy
The preferences in the ELEA economy are given by Assumption 4. The denition
of the competitive equilibrium remains unchanged. The FOC for the representative
agent's problem, given by (10), now reads
Qt+1 = (Ht+1)Ht+1kt+1, (27)






Qt+1 = (1   )Qt   Htkt +  ((1   )Ht(f(kt)   ktf0(kt))   Ht+1kt+1)
(28)
12Looking at these dynamics, it turns out that the ratio between environmental
quality and physical capital cannot be kept constant because of the endogeneity of
environmental awareness. Let us investigate the kind of outcome that may emerge
from (28).
4.1 Long run equilibria
Denition 5 Asymptotic balanced growth path (ABGP)
An economy follows an asymptotic balanced growth path if it approaches a balanced
growth path asymptotically.
An asymptotic BGP occurs when a BGP cannot be reached but is gradually
converged as time goes to innity. The very characteristics of an asymptotic BGP is
that, even if no proper BGP exists, the growth rates of state variables of the economy
still approach a constant and common value. In the following proposition, we show





Q = ( ((1   )(f(k)   kf0(k))   k)   k)H
g(f(k)) = 1
(29)
Proposition 3 In the ELEA economy:
 there exists a unique ABGP under conditions (19)-(21);
 there exists a unique steady state if and only if:
(1   )






with ~ k, the long run physical to human capital ratio.
Proof. The proof of existence of an ABGP is provided in Appendix C.
As for the existence of a SS, the last equation in (29) gives the equilibrium ratio
between K and H







and combining the two rst equations yields:
( ~ H) = (1   )
f(~ k)   ~ kf0(~ k)
~ k
       0 if (30) holds.
Thus the steady state level of human capital is:







f(~ k())   ~ k()f0(~ k())
~ k()
     
!!
;
13and is uniquely dened under the assumptions regarding f(k) and (H). Finally, we
obtain: ~ K() = ~ k() ~ H() and ~ Q() = ( ~ H()) ~ K().
In the previous section, we have shown that the accumulation of knowledge, to-
gether with environmental maintenance, was sucient to promote sustainable growth.
This result does not necessarily hold once the positive impact of education on envi-
ronmental awareness is taken into account. To understand this property, simply refer
to the trade-os governing the agent's decisions. An increase in the eort mt is a
means to improve environmental quality and thus to enhance welfare. However, it
also implies a fall in the non-environmental component of welfare since both savings
and old age consumption decrease. Consequently, the agent chooses mt to equate
the marginal benet of maintenance to its marginal cost. Now, other things equal,
with the accumulation of knowledge the agent pays more attention to the environ-
ment. The marginal benet of maintenance tends to be higher than its marginal
cost, giving an incentive to the agent to allocate more resources to maintenance at
the expense of savings. This substitution eect is accompanied by an income eect,
since more knowledge means more production and more resources to be devoted to
savings and maintenance. However, the latter eect does not always oset the former
and economic growth may not be sustained.
The literature on endogenous growth and the environment has dened the neces-
sary conditions on technology, preferences and environmental dynamics for a balanced
growth to be possible (for a review of these conditions, refer to Bovenberg and Smul-
ders 1995, 1996 and Bovenberg and de Mooij 1997). In particular, in optimal growth
models, the elasticity or environmental awareness  is required to be constant. That
is the reason why the papers in this eld systematically consider utility functions
with constant elasticity. In our setting, there exists an ABGP, which is economi-
cally similar to a BGP, even if this condition does not hold. Indeed, it turns out
that this condition can be relaxed by simply requiring environmental awareness to be
bounded from above (since 0(H) > 0), this boundary corresponding to a state of full
awareness.
The result in proposition 3 clearly challenges the optimistic vision shared in the
literature that the accumulation of knowledge fosters economic growth while being
compatible with environmental improvement. If the economy may follow an ABGP,
it may also be caught in a steady state, thereby loosing the opportunity to accu-
mulate wealth and to improve environmental quality forever. An interesting issue is
to determine under which conditions the economy may reach one trajectory or the
other. A rst answer is provided with the analysis of local stability. Let us dene
e =
H0(H)
(H) > 0, the elasticity of environmental awareness with respect to H.
Proposition 4 i/ Local stability of the ABGP imposes: ~ e  ~ ew;




(1   )( ~ H)~ e, ~ e =
1 + ( ~ H)
( ~ H)~ e
14and  = (1 + ( ~ H))(1   ~ e)  


 + ( ~ H) + 1

(1   ~ ew) > 0.
In other words, the stability of the SS is more dicult to obtain than the one
of the ABGP. Actually, the curvature of (H) is crucial for the stability analysis.
When (H) is at, environmental awareness is relatively insensitive to the level of
knowledge. The dynamics behave as if we were in the CEA economy. Thus, there is no
room for convergence toward the SS and the economy will be drawn along the ABGP.
In contrast, if environmental awareness exhibits a strong reaction to a change in H,
then the accumulation of knowledge substantially aects the dynamics, through this
new channel, and may drive the ELEA economy to the SS. The inuence of human
capital on awareness must be signicant, that is, 0(H) must be high enough. This is
the sense of ~ e  ~ e. Now, at the same time, stability requires the magnitude of the
impact of knowledge to be bounded from above (~ e  ~ e).
4.2 Comparative statics
Again, we are interested in the impacts of a policy promoting education but now, on
the steady state. From the denition of k() (see eq. (31)), we have k0() < 0: an
increase in the tax rate lowers the equilibrium ratio from physical to human capital.
This corresponds to a crowding-out eect according to which public expenditures on
education are done at the expense of private savings.
In order to assess the impact of a change in  on wealth and the environment, the
same approach as in section 3.2 is followed. We use the specications of Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997) and, in addition, we dene the expression of (H):
f(k) = Ak,  2 (0;1)
g(e) = Be1 ,  2 (0;1)





with   > 0;" > 0
Here, the parameter   may be identied to the constant elasticity discussed in Section
3. It means that, starting with a stock of human capital H0  ", the value of (H) is
rst lower than   and then monotonically converges to   as the economy accumulates
knowledge. Considering these functional forms, the steady state values of human and
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In equilibrium, maintenance can be expressed as a share of physical capital, and this
share is precisely given by (): m() = ()K(). Condition (30) reads () 

,
it implies equilibrium maintenance is positive. Moreover, the existence of the steady
state requires the coecient   +







Proposition 5 In the steady state,
i/ if   1   , then raising the tax decreases physical and human capital, and
environmental quality;
ii/ if  < 1   , then raising the tax increases human capital, but the eect on
physical capital and the environment is unclear.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Even if the usual argument developed in the literature (and discussed in Section
3.2) holds for the sensitivity of knowledge to the tax, it is no longer the case for
physical capital and environmental quality. In other words, having initially  < 1  is
necessary but not sucient to get a double dividend. Indeed, an additional eect plays
with the increase in the tax rate. A higher tax tends to stimulate the accumulation of
knowledge. But this, in turn, modies the agent's preferences that become greener.
Consequently, she allocates more resources to maintenance at the expense of savings
and physical capital accumulation. This is a possible explanation of the fact that the
critical level of the tax rate,11 if it exists, is located somewhere below the labor share
in output.
The additional eect may lead to a steady state with a lower level of physical
capital. The impact on environmental quality is more complicated since, according
to the rst condition in (29), environmental quality is positively related to human
and physical capital. If physical capital increases in response to the higher tax, then
environmental quality increases too. There exists a double dividend. Otherwise, the
overall impact is indeterminate since H increases whereas K decreases.
In sum, the policy might procure a double dividend (more growth and better
environmental quality), but it requires the initial tax to be rather low, and lower
than the usual bound 1   .
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed an OLG model with public expenditures on educa-
tion and the environment. Our purpose was to assess a new channel through which
education and the accumulation of knowledge may inuence economic and environ-
mental dynamics: the environmental awareness. For this purpose, we compared two
11In the sense that it determines whether or not the reform has a positive impact on K and Q.
16cases. First, assuming constant environmental awareness, we have generalized the
conclusion of the literature on education and growth by showing the existence of
a balanced growth path that is environmentally sustainable. Next, we have explic-
itly modelled the relationship between knowledge and environmental awareness. The
competitive equilibrium then exhibits distinct features. In contrast with the previous
case, constant growth is no longer the rule. Rather, the economy may reach either a
steady state or an asymptotic balanced growth path in the long run. The convergence
towards one or the other equilibrium is dictated by the environmental awareness sen-
sitivity to knowledge. An analysis of the impact of the education policy on growth
and the environment, still based on the comparison between the two cases, was also
conducted. Again, the role played by the endogenous awareness is highlighted. The
critical level of taxation that determines whether, by raising the tax, the economy
may experience a higher growth rate and a better environmental quality is lowered
when awareness is endogenous.
Taking into account the positive inuence of knowledge on environmental aware-
ness challenges the very existence of a sustainable growth path, as it is generally
advocated in the literature. Indeed, with the accumulation of knowledge awareness
increases and agents progressively divert themselves from polluting activities. This
evolution in tastes benets to the environment, since agents get higher incentives to
engage in green activities. This results in welfare improvement but, in the meantime,
may preclude balanced growth.
17Appendices
A Existence of a BGP (prop. 1)
In the long run, the growth factor of K, H and Q is equal to:
Ht+1
Ht = g(f(k)).
According to (12), the ratio from environmental quality to human capital is:
Qt+1
Ht+1 =
k. Combining the rst and third eqs. in (15) yields:
(1 + )Ht+1kt+1 = (1   )Qt   Htkt + (1   )Ht(f(kt)   ktf
0(kt))
Dividing both sides of this eq. by Ht and evaluating this eq. along a BGP give:
(1 + )g(f(k))
| {z }
= (1   )
f(k)   kf0(k)
k




Proving the existence of a BGP boils down to showing that there exists an intersection
between I(k) and J(k).
From assumption 1. & 2., I(k) is increasing and concave. Moreover, I(0) = 0 and
limk!+1 I(k) = +1.
The rst derivative of J(k) is
J




therefore, J0(k)  0 $ (k)  s(k). Since there exists an upper bound to the
attainable capital, we necessarily have limk!+1
f(k) kf0(k)
k = 0 $ limk!+1 J(k) =









then 0 < limk!0 J(k) < 1.
There exists a unique intersection  k between the two functions. Since
Ht+1
Ht =
g(f( k)), it means that the unique constant growth rate is  = g(f( k))   1.




(kt)qt+1 = (1   )qt   kt + (1   )w(kt)   (kt)kt+1
18with qt =
Qt
Ht and (kt) = g(f(kt)). Linearize the dynamics around the steady
state ( k;  q) and make use of (35), the system reduces to one dimensional dynamics:








(1 + )( k)
(1    e
w) +  e




where  ex, for x = w;, is the long run elasticity with respect to k:  ex =
 kx0( k)
x( k) .
Assume  e <  ew. Since  ew = s( k)s( e), with s( e) the share of public expenditures
in the education technology,  e <  ew $ s( e) < 1
( k) (since s( e) < 1, it holds for
the Cobb-Douglas, the CES with   0 and for some  < 0 not to close to  1).
 e <  ew together with (21) implies   > 0. Local stability then imposes:   < 1 that
is equivalent to:

(1   )  

   (1 + )( k)

(1    ew) < (1 + )( k) e. According
to (35), this inequality is satised.
To summarize, if  e <  ew, then the BGP is locally stable.
C Existence of an ABGP (prop. 3)
We are interested in cases where agregate variables grow at non negative, non con-































 Assume rst limt!+1 kt = 0 $ limt!+1 Kt  limt!+1 Ht:
From (+) and g(0) = f(0) = 0, limt!+1 Ht = 0 which contradicts the condition
i  1 for all i.
 Assume next limt!+1 kt = +1 $ limt!+1 Kt  limt!+1 Ht:
At least asymptotically, we have Kt > Ht: limt!+1 Kt > limt!+1 Ht.
From (+), limk!+1 f(k) = +1 and lime!+1 g(e) = +1, it turns out that
limt!+1 Ht = g(f(limt!+1 kt)) = +1. Thus, limt!+1 Ht = +1 and, from as-
sumption 4, limt!+1 (Ht) =  .
Together with (), limt!+1
Qt+1
Kt+1 =  . Therefore, limt!+1 Kt = limt!+1 Qt.





























then limt!+1 Kt = limt!+1 Qt < +1 = limt!+1 Ht. There is a contradiction.
) The only possibility is limt!+1 kt = ~ k, with 0 < ~ k < 1, which implies:
limt!+1 Kt = limt!+1 Ht. From (+), limt!+1 Ht = g(f(~ k)). If g(f(~ k))  1,
then limt!+1 (Ht) =  . From (), limt!+1
Qt+1
Kt+1 =  . Therefore, limt!+1 Kt =
limt!+1 Qt = limt!+1 Ht. Now, from (37),







This equation is similar to (35), in appendix A. Under the conditions of proposition 1,
~ k exists (uniqueness) and denes the asymptotic constant growth rate g(f(~ k))   1.
There exists a asymptotic BGP for the dynamics above. The system will converge,
in the long run, to a BGP dened in terms of ~ k.
Remark: conditions for local stability of the ABGP are similar to the ones dened
for the BGP except that ~ k now replaces  k.
D Local stability for SS (prop. 4)








(1   )dQt + (1 + ( ~ H) + ~ e)dHt + ~ H(((1 + ( ~ H))~ ew + ~ e~ e)   (1   ~ ew))dkt

dQt+1 = ((1 )dQt ~ k( ~ H)(1 +~ e)dHt+ ~ H(((1+( ~ H))~ ew (1+( ~ H)(1+~ e))~ e) (1 ~ ew))dkt)
~ H(1+( ~ H))
dHt+1 = dHt +
~ H
~ k ~ edkt
;
note that the same denitions as those of Appendix B. are used. In addition, we
dene: ~ e =
~ H0( ~ H)
( ~ H) . One root of the associated characteristic polynomial is nil, then
it simplies to:
P() =  




1 + ( ~ H)






+ ( ~ H) + 1

(1   ~ e






1 + ( ~ H)
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+ ( ~ H) + 1

(1   ~ e




20Assume again ~ e < ~ ew and (1   )( ~ H) 

 (rewriting of (21)), then  =
(1 + ( ~ H))(1   ~ e)  


 + ( ~ H) + 1

(1   ~ ew) > 0.
What is changing here, with regard to Appendix B, is the role played by education,
through its inuence on EA. Thus, a natural way to address the question of local
stability is to look for conditions on ~ e that ensure it.








P( 1) =  2A + P(1)
We easily check there exists a non empty range [~ e; ~ e] (if ~ e > ) for the EA's




(1   )( ~ H)~ e and ~ e =
1 + ( ~ H)
( ~ H)~ e
since, in this case, we have A;B > 0 $ P( 1) < 0 and P(0) > 0. The two roots of
P() belongs to ]   1;1[ and have opposite sign. Convergence is oscillatory.
To summarize, if ~ ew > ~ e >  and ~ e 2 [~ e; ~ e], then the SS is locally stable.
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it means that   1  ! K0() < 0. Otherwise, the sign of   +

 () 0()

































and we also have   1    ! Q0() < 0 whereas there is no simple condition
allowing us to determine the impact when  < 1   .
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